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Abstract
The endorsement of expansionary fiscal packages has often been based on the idea that large
multipliers can counteract rising and persistent unemployment. We explore the effectiveness of
fiscal stimuli in a model with matching frictions and endogenous participation. Results show that
hiring subsidies, contrary to increase in government spending, deliver large multipliers, even with
distortionary taxation. Those policies increase the incentives to post vacancies, hence employ-
ment. Furthermore, by reducing marginal costs they also reduce inflation and increase private
consumption.
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1 Introduction
The endorsement of expansionary fiscal packages has often been based on the idea
that large multipliers can counteract rising and persistent unemployment. Following
the 2007-2008 crisis, various national governments around the globe have passed
expansionary fiscal packages arguing that, with nominal interest rates at the zero
lower bound, only strong fiscal stimuli could help to counteract the recession and
rising unemployment. In the United States the fiscal stimulus involved, in addition
to a pure increase in government spending, also incentives to hiring. With the Hiring
Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act, enacted onMarch 18, 2010, new tax
benefits have been made available to employers who hire previously unemployed
workers and who maintain them for a certain period of time. In Europe the response
to the raising unemployment in the aftermath of the crisis took mainly the form
of measures reducing layoffs.1 While some time will elapse before economists
can judge the relative success of measures reducing hiring costs versus measures
reducing layoffs, this paper focuses on examining the effectiveness of the first by
means of fiscal multipliers.
Recent and past literature (reviewed below) shows that generally fiscal mul-
tipliers for demand stimuli are small in business cycle models with various nominal
and real frictions. However, none of the previous studies considered fiscal stim-
uli in the form of hiring subsidies. We do so using a New Keynesian model with
matching frictions and endogenous workers’ participation. The presence of un-
employment and cost of hiring renders the model particularly suitable to analyze
the relative effectiveness of traditional increases in government spending versus
increases in hiring subsidies. Furthermore, in our model participation decisions
depend procyclically upon the expected returns from search: adverse market con-
ditions, as those fueled by a crisis, can discourage potential workers from entering
the labor market, therefore increasing unemployment.2
We compute short-run and long-run multipliers for both traditional increases
in government spending and increases in hiring subsidies. Under a variety of spec-
ification for parameters and policies, we find two general results. Traditional gov-
ernment spending policies deliver low multipliers, confirming results in the previ-
ous literature, while hiring policies deliver large multipliers. The rationale for the
results is as follows. Due to the crowding out of private demand, increases in gov-
ernment spending reduce rather than increase vacancy posting and increase labor
1Examples include the Cassa Integrazione in Italy, the Kurzarbeit scheme in Germany, the
choˆmage partiel in France. Those are essentially short time work schemes that have an impact
on the firing margin rather than on the hiring margin.
2The discouraged workers’ effect is considered as one of the potential explanations of the jobless
recovery.
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market tightness. Unemployment is higher and its fluctuations are more amplified.
This is even more so under distortionary taxation, as households expect that the
increase in government spending will be financed with future tax increases. Inter-
estingly, in our model households increase participation in the labor market, due to
the mild increase of aggregate demand on impact, making it easier for firms to fill
their vacancies. This has a positive effect on vacancy posting decisions and overall
vacancies increase, even though only in the short run. As a result, multipliers are
higher than in a model with exogenous participation but remain still well below 1.3
On the other side, hiring subsidies deliver positive and large multipliers,
even with distortionary taxation. A reduction in the cost of hiring indeed boosts
vacancy creation, hence employment.4 Importantly, hiring subsidies reduce the
marginal costs of workers. The ensuing reduction in inflation produces a crowding
in of private consumption, which in fact rises. Participation overall declines due to
the positive income effect.
Our work is closely related to a number of papers considering fiscal stim-
uli with a particular focus on policies designed to improve the safety net: those
contributions include Davig and Leeper (2011), Davig, Leeper, and Walker (2010)
and Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2010). Our paper is generally related to the recent
literature on fiscal multipliers which includes, among others, Romer and Bernstein
(2009), Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, and Wieland (2010), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Rebelo (2009). Within this literature Uhlig (2010) and Leeper, Plante, and Traum
(2010) show that distortionary taxation dampens the multipliers.5 In our model the
dampening effect also works through depressing vacancy creation and job finding
rates. Recently, other authors have analyzed multipliers from aggregate demand
stimuli in models with labor market frictions. Yuan and Li (2000) show, within
an RBC model, that matching frictions amplify the crowding out effects, hence
they reduce multipliers. Monacelli, Perotti, and Trigari (2010) examine govern-
ment spending multipliers in a model with matching frictions and find that they
are small, even when adding endogenous job destruction and capital. Finally, Faia,
Lechthaler, and Merkl (2010), using a labor selection model, confirm the results of
small multipliers for demand stimuli. None of the above papers considers hiring
3In response to government expenditure shocks, employment increases due to the increase in
vacancy creation. However, the increase in vacancy posting is not enough to compensate the in-
crease in the participation rate, hence unemployment rises as well. This is consistent with empirical
evidence recently provided in Bruckner and Pappa (2010).
4Notice that in this model we do not consider an endogenous firing margin, since we assume an
exogenous destruction rate. Under endogenous job destruction the equilibrium increase in employ-
ment might come along with an increase in the mass of firings: such an effect might partly, although
not entirely, dampen the beneficial effect of hiring policies.
5See Baxter and King (1993) for early results on this.
..
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subsidies and endogenous participation. Both elements add realism to the model:
hiring subsidies indeed represent an important measure of the fiscal stimulus pack-
ages and endogenous participation allows for the discouraged worker effect, which
is typical of depressions following crises.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model econ-
omy and describes the fiscal sector. Section 3 shows the results on multipliers.
Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 A DNK Model with Matching Frictions and En-
dogenous Participation
There is a continuum of agents whose total measure is normalized to one. The
economy is populated by households who consume different varieties of goods,
save, work and home produce. Each family member can either actively participate
in the labor market or stay at home. The labor market is characterized by matching
frictions so that active members can be either employed or unemployed. In the first
case, they allocate all their time endowment to work and receive a wage that is deter-
mined according to Nash bargaining. In the second case, they allocate a fraction of
time to the search activity, while the remaining is used for home production. They
also receive an unemployment benefit. The production sector is monopolistically
competitive and faces quadratic adjustment costs in pricing.
2.1 Households
Household’s size is normalized to 1: Households make consumption and labor par-
ticipation decisions. The latter is modeled along the lines of Campolmi and Gnoc-
chi (2011). Only a fraction nt of family members actively participate into the labor
market, while 1 nt voluntarily choose non-employment. Active members can be
either employed or unemployed. Household’s expected life time utility is given by:
E0
(
¥
å
t=0
b t
"
Yt
c1 st
1 s +F
h1+nt
1+n
#)
(1)
where ct denotes consumption, Yt is a preference shock, F is a scaling parame-
ter that pins down the steady state participation rate, n < 0 is the inverse of the
home production elasticity, s > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution in consumption, and ht denotes home production.
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We assume instantaneous hiring so that matched workers start to work in
the same period the match occurred. Hence, in each period workers searching for a
job (beginning of the period unemployed) are given by:
st = nt  (1 r)et 1 (2)
while employment evolves according to:
et = (1 r)(1  ft)et 1+ ftnt (3)
where r is an exogenous destruction rate and ft is the job finding rate. The latter
will be specified when modeling matching frictions.
Inactive family members allocate all their time to home production, con-
trary to employed family members that have no time left for this activity. Family
members that were not in a match at the beginning of the period, and whose search
activity was not successful, obtain the unemployment status and allocate the re-
maining time to home production. They are given by ut = nt   et . We use G to
denote the cost of search. We thus define home production as given by:
ht = ¡t(1  et Gut) (4)
where ¡t is a shock to home production technology.6
Unemployed family members receive a real unemployment benefit b. Total
real labor income is given by wtet . The contract signed between the worker and the
firm specifies the wage and is obtained through a Nash bargaining process. Agents
also invest in non-state contingent nominal government bonds Bt which pay a gross
nominal interest rate (1+ rnt ) one period later. Finally, agents receive profits from
the monopolistic sector which they own, Qt . Agents are subject to the following tax
system: tnt is a tax on wages, tc is a tax on consumption, and tt represents lump
sum taxation. Family members pool their incomes and home production that are
then redistributed equally among all members so that they all enjoy the same level
of consumption and home production.7 The sequence of real budget constraints
reads as follows:
(1+ tc)ct+
Bt
pt
 (1  tnt )wtet+but+
Qt
pt
  tt+(1+ rnt 1)
Bt 1
pt
(5)
Households choose fct ;Bt ;nt ;ht ;etg¥t=0 taking as given fpt ; wt ; rnt ; ft , tnt , tt , Qtg¥t=0
and the initial wealth B0; so as to maximize (1) subject to (3), (4) and (5). Let’s
6We are assuming a linear production technology in the home sector, similarly to what we assume
in the market sector.
7See Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995).
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define lt as the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (5). Optimality in consump-
tion/saving delivers the following conditions:
lt =Yt
c st
1+ tc
(6)
1= b (1+ rnt )Et

lt+1
lt
pt
pt+1

(7)
Equation (6) is the marginal utility of consumption and equation (7) is the Euler
condition with respect to bonds. Optimality requires that the no-Ponzi condition on
wealth be also satisfied. Merging the first order conditions with respect to the set
fnt ;ht ;etg¥t=0 delivers the following participation condition:
Wt = wt(1  tnt )  (1+ tc)
Fhnt cst
Yt
¡t+b (1 r)Et

lt+1
lt
Wt+1

(8)
where Wt  1  ftft
h
(1+ tc)FGh
n
t c
s
t
Yt ¡t b
i
represents the utility loss required to mar-
ginally increase employment. Indeed, (1+ tc)FGh
n
t c
s
t
Yt ¡t   b represents the utility
lost when moving one family member from non-participant to unemployed while
1  ft
ft
represents the wedge introduced by matching frictions and captures the extra
loss (relative to a frictionless labor market) needed to exactly increase employment
by one unit. Thus, equation (8) equates the marginal benefit of having one extra
family member employed (right hand side) to its marginal cost.
Absent the wedge created by matching frictions, the above condition would
collapse to the standard labor/leisure optimality condition, wt
(1 tnt )
(1+tc) =
Fhnt cst
Yt ¡t :
Here instead, and as noted in Mortensen and Pissarides (2000) (chapter 7), the par-
ticipation rate co-moves, other things being equal, with the job finding rate. When
the job finding rate is low, the return from search is low too and workers prefer to
stay at home. In the next section we show that the job finding rate is endogenously
determined by the presence of matching frictions. Whenever the job finding rate is
low, more of the jobless workers will leave the labor force. For our positive anal-
ysis, the most immediate consequence of this link is that policies which affect the
job finding rate will also move participation and this will feed back into the finding
rate and, ultimately, in the fiscal multipliers.
At last notice the role of the Frisch elasticity,  1v . The higher its value,
the more workers tend to substitute home with market production in response to
changes in the returns to search. Hence, the marginal effect of policies increasing
the job finding rate is larger under a larger elasticity.
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2.2 Search and Matching in the Labor Market
The search activity is costly. The probability of finding a worker depends on a
constant return to scale matching technology converting searching workers st and
vacancies vt into matches:
m(st ;vt) = ms
x
t v
1 x
t (9)
where vt =
R 1
0 vt(i)di and m represents the matching efficiency. Defining labor mar-
ket tightness as qt  vtst , firms meet searching workers at rate q(qt) =
m(st ;vt)
vt
=
mq xt , while searching workers meet vacancies at rate ft  qtq(qt)=mq1 xt , which
we refer to as the job finding rate. If the search process is successful, the firm
in the monopolistic good sector operates the technology ztet(i), where zt is the
aggregate productivity shock which follows a first order autoregressive process,
logzt = rz logzt 1+ ez;t ; and et(i) is the number of workers hired by firm i. At the
beginning of period t firms observe the realization of the stochastic variables and
post vacancies accordingly.
2.3 Monopolistic Firms
There is continuum of firms which hire a continuum of workers. Firms in the mo-
nopolistic sector use labor to produce different varieties of the consumption good:
ct =
hR 1
0 ct(i)
e 1
e
i e
e 1 . They face a quadratic cost of adjusting prices and have to
pay costs of posting vacancies which are linear in the number of vacancies. Due
to the constant return to scale of vacancy posting technology, firms can take wages
as given when choosing prices and employment. The representative firm chooses
prices, pt(i), number of vacancies, vt(i); and number of employees, et(i) to solve
the following maximization problem (in real terms):8
MaxE0
¥
å
t=0
bt
lt
l0
(
pt(i)
pt
ztet(i) wt(i)et(i)  (1  tkt )kvt(i) 
y
2

pt(i)
pt 1(i)
 1
2
dt
)
(10)
subject to
ztet(i) =

pt(i)
pt
 e
dt (11)
et(i) = (1 r)et 1(i)+ vt(i)q(qt) (12)
where dt is aggregate demand inclusive of resources wasted for search activity and
price adjustment, y2

pt(i)
pt 1(i)  1
2
dt represents the cost of adjusting prices, y can
8Note that equation (12) is the equivalent of (3) just written at the firm level.
6
The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 11 [2011], Iss. 1 (Contributions), Art. 38
DOI: 10.2202/1935-1690.2280
Brought to you by | University of Glasgow Library
Authenticated | 10.248.254.158
Download Date | 8/25/14 5:09 AM
be thought of as the sluggishness in the price adjustment process, k as the cost of
posting vacancies, tkt is a subsidy to the cost of posting vacancies, and wt(i) is the
real wage paid by firm i. Let us define mct , the Lagrange multiplier on constraint
(11), as the marginal cost of firms and mt ; the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (12),
as the marginal value of one worker. Since all firms will choose in equilibrium the
same price and allocation we can now assume symmetry and drop the index i. Let
us define the inflation rate as pt  ptpt 1 . First order conditions read as follows:
mt = mctzt wt+bEt

lt+1
lt
(1 r)mt+1

(13)
k(1  tkt )
q(qt)
= mt (14)
y(pt 1)pt bEt

lt+1
lt
y(pt+1 1)pt+1 zt+1et+1ztet

= 1  e(1 mct) (15)
By merging (13) and (14) we obtain the job creation condition:
k(1  tkt )
q(qt)
= mctzt wt+bEt
(
lt+1
lt
(1 r)k(1  t
k
t+1)
q(qt+1)
)
(16)
2.4 Nash Bargaining
The wage schedule is obtained through the solution to an individual Nash bargain-
ing process. Let us denote by V Jt the marginal discounted value of a vacancy for a
firm. From equation (13) and noticing that V Jt = mt we obtain:
V Jt = mctzt wt+bEt

lt+1
lt
(1 r)V Jt+1

(17)
The marginal value of a vacancy depends on real revenues minus the real wage plus
the discounted continuation value. With probability (1 r) the job remains filled
and earns the expected value, while with probability r the job is destroyed and has
zero value. In equilibrium, the marginal discounted value of a vacancy equalizes
the expected cost of posting vacancies. For each worker, the surplus from being
employed, keeping participation constant, is given by VWt :
9
VWt = (1  tnt )wt b 
F(1 G)hnt cst (1+ tc)
Yt
¡t (18)
+bEt

lt+1
lt
(1 r)(1  ft+1)VWt+1

9See Campolmi and Gnocchi (2011) for the complete derivation.
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Let V being the workers’ bargaining power. The optimal sharing rule of the
standard Nash bargaining is given by:
VWt =
V
1  V (1  t
n
t )V
J
t (19)
After substituting the previously defined value functions into (19) it is possible to
derive the following wage schedule:
wt = Vmctzt+
1  V
1  tnt

b+
F(1 G)hnt cst (1+ tc)
Yt
¡t

(20)
+ V(1 r)bEt
(
lt+1
lt

1  (1  ft+1)
1  tnt+1
1  tnt
 k(1  tkt+1)
q(qt+1)
)
2.5 EquilibriumConditions, Monetary Policy and Fiscal Regimes
The goods market clearing condition requires aggregate production to be equal to
aggregate demand, yt  ct + gt , plus the resources wasted into the search activity
and the cost of adjusting prices:
ztet = yt+kvt+
y
2

pt
pt 1
 1
2
ztet (21)
Monetary policy is conducted by means of an interest rate reaction function of the
following form:
ln

1+ rnt
1+ rn

= (1 fr)

fp ln
pt
p

+fy ln

yt
y

+fr ln

1+ rnt 1
1+ rn

(22)
The government faces the following budget constraint:
gt+but+(1+ rnt 1)
Bt 1
pt
+ tkt kvt = tcct+ tnt wtet+
Bt
pt
+ tt (23)
Since government expenditure is financed partly with taxes and partly with govern-
ment bonds, we need some rule to pin down the evolution of government bonds.
First, we assume that tt = t . Furthermore, following Uhlig (2010) we assume that
a fraction f of expenditure is financed through labor taxes while the rest is financed
through government bonds:
tnt wtet = f

gt+but+ tkt kvt  t+(1+ rnt 1)
Bt 1
pt
  tcct

(24)
We consider two possible targets for government expenditure: aggregate demand
and subsidy to cost of posting vacancies. They are both modeled through temporary
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shocks. Government expenditure in the form of demand stimuli takes the following
form:
lngt = (1 rg) lng+rg lngt 1+ egt (25)
where egt is a surprise increase. Similarly, a hiring subsidy takes the following form:
lntkt = (1 rtk) lntk+rtk lntkt 1+ et
k
t (26)
where etkt is a surprise increase.
2.6 The Policies Transmission Mechanism
Before moving to the quantitative results of our model in terms of fiscal multipliers,
it is instructive to examine the analytics and the intuition of the policy transmission
mechanisms in our model, with particular reference to the different mechanics pro-
duced by an increase in government spending as opposed to an increase in hiring
subsidies. As anticipated in the introduction, wasteful government spending crowds
out private consumption, therefore reducing the positive effect on aggregate demand
and employment in the periods following the intervention. On the contrary, hiring
subsidies increase both vacancy posting and aggregate demand via an increase in
private consumption. The difference between those two policies effectively hinges
upon their different impact on marginal costs and inflation, hence on the different
response of monetary policy to the two fiscal packages. To understand the rationale
behind this result, we start by analyzing the effects of policies on the marginal cost
equation:
mct =
k(1 tkt )
q(qt) +wt bEt

lt+1
lt (1 r)
k(1 tkt+1)
q(qt+1)

zt
(27)
The equation above states that firms’ marginal costs equate the cost of a
marginal hire in t, plus the wage paid to that worker in period t minus the saved
marginal cost of hiring tomorrow. An increase in government spending, by increas-
ing aggregate demand on impact, produces an increase in wages. The latter induces,
in turn, an increase in the marginal cost, as from equation (27), and an increase in
inflation, via the Phillips curve, equation (15). It is such an increase in inflation
which, by triggering an increase in the interest rate via the Taylor rule, produces
a crowding out of private consumption. As aggregate demand falls in the periods
following the intervention, vacancy posting falls as well. This is at the heart of why
this type of fiscal intervention delivers low multipliers in terms of both employment
and aggregate demand.
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On the contrary, hiring subsidies reduces the cost of hiring. This, all else
equal, reduces marginal costs and inflation, via the Phillips curve. Notice that while
wages increase, since workers now face a better outside option, the direct effect of
hiring subsidies dominates. Overall, in our quantitative simulations we observe a
fall in marginal costs and inflation for a wide range of parameters’ values. The fall
in inflation generates an interest rate cut that produces a crowding in of private con-
sumption and an overall increase in aggregate demand. Vacancy posting increases,
and so do employment and output.
2.7 Calibration and Quantitative Properties of the Model
When computing fiscal multipliers, and to check how robust our results are, we per-
form the following analysis. First, we calibrate the model to the U.S. economy and
compute the multipliers for what we call our baseline model. Second, we perform
a series of robustness checks changing (one by one) a set of crucial parameters, and
considering alternative policy scenarios.
The calibration of the labor market parameters has been done so as to gen-
erate steady state values for the job flows, the cost of vacancies and the surpluses
which are either in line with the data or with the literature. Tables 1 and 2 con-
tain a selected set of steady state values for job flows, vacancy costs and surpluses
generated by the model.
Table 1: Steady State Job Flows
Unemployment rate Participation rate Tightness Job finding rate Job filling rate
0.06 0.66 0.75 0.52 0.70
Table 2: Steady State Costs and Surpluses
Vacancy posting costs (% of y) Vacancy posting costs (% of w  e)
0.017 0.021
Value of a vacancy (% of y) Surplus of being employed (% of y)
0.39 0.28
Preferences. Time is measured in quarters. The discount factor b is set
equal to 0:99, so that the annual real interest rate is equal to 4 percent. The inverse
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution s is set equal to 2.
Production. Following Basu and Fernald (1997), the value added mark-up
of prices over marginal cost is set to 0:2. This generates a value for the price elas-
ticity of demand e of 6: We parametrize the cost of adjusting prices by comparing
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the Phillips curve under Rotemberg (1982) adjustment costs with the one under
Calvo-Yun set-up. Consistent with a Calvo probability of adjusting prices of 2/3,
this delivers a value of y  30.
Labor market frictions parameters. The matching technology is a homoge-
nous of degree one function and is characterized by the parameter x : Consistently
with estimates by Blanchard and Diamond (1991) this parameter is set to 0:4. The
exogenous separation probability r is set to 0:07, consistently with estimates from
Hall (1995).10 By setting the employment rate equal to 94%, and given the exoge-
nous separation probability of 0:07, we obtain an implied job finding rate of 0.52
(see Table 1). This value is lower than the one estimated in Shimer (2005), the rea-
son being that our model features instantaneous hiring, upon which workers can be
matched in the same period in which they start searching. The scaling parameter in
the matching technology m is set so as to induce a job filling rate q of 0:7 (see Table
1), which is the value used by den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000). This also
implies a value for the labor market tightness of 0.74, which is slightly lower, but
in line, with the value obtained in Shimer (2005). For the parameters concerning
the endogenous participation side of the model, we follow Campolmi and Gnocchi
(2011) and set F using (8) so as to target a steady state participation rate n = 0:66
(see Table 1), consistent with the evidence for the U.S. We set n =  5 implying
a Frisch elasticity for labor supply of 0:2. Finally, we set G = 0:44. We interpret
the cost of search as the time devoted to home production that a household member
loses when moving from non-participant to unemployed, compared to the time lost
when moving from non-participant to employed. This value has been computed us-
ing data on time allocated to home production by employed, unemployed and out of
the labor force individuals as provided by the American Time Use Survey (ATUS).
We define the replacement ratio as the value of the outside option for an unem-
ployed worker (unemployment benefit plus home production obtained when not
involved in the search activity) relative to the wage and we set it equal to 0.6. This
value implies a b=w ratio of 0.2, a value within the admissible range of (0:2;0:4) as
reported in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) and Mortensen and Nagypal (2007).
With those values, and using the fact that the steady state number of matches is
given by r1 r (1  u), it is possible to determine the number of vacancies and the
vacancy/unemployment ratio. The bargaining power of workers V is set to 0.5 as in
most papers in the literature, while the value for the cost of posting vacancies k is
set to achieve a steady state cost of posting vacancies (both, as percentage of wages
and as percentage of output; see Table 2) which is in line with the literature (see
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), Silva and Toledo (2007)).
10This value is also compatible with those used in the literature which range from 0.07 (Merz
(1995)) to 0.15 (Andolfatto (1996)).
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Notice that the value for a filled vacancy for a firm is relatively small (see
Table 2): this is consistent with arguments done in Costain and Reiter (2008) stating
that in order to match the response of unemployment and wages to both, productiv-
ity and policy shocks, one needs to choose a calibration which delivers a relatively
small surplus for the match.
Monetary and fiscal policy parameters and shocks. The coefficient on in-
flation fp is set to 1:5 while the coefficient on output fy is set 0:5=4. Finally, the
parameter fr is set equal to zero in the baseline calibration. The constant fraction of
public spending g financed by current taxes is calibrated so as to match g=y= 0:15.
Steady state taxes are set to tc = 0:05 and tn = 0:28 which are values calculated for
the U.S. by Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). The steady state level of the hiring subsidy
is set to tk = 0:01: Under the assumption of distortionary taxation, f is set to 0:275
so as to generate By = 0:6. The autocorrelations of government spending rg and of
the hiring subsidy rtk are calibrated to 0.9.
It is important to notice that the baseline parametrization outlined above is
also consistent with the value which the literature generally assigns to the elasticity
of wages to productivity shocks. In our model such elasticity is 0.51. Shimer
(2005) argues that, in the standard search and matching model, the sensitivity of
wages to productivity shocks is excessively large compared to the data (around
0.9 in the model and 0.49 in the data). In this respect our model is successful in
reproducing a low elasticity of wages to productivity shock. This elasticity is also
important in guiding the interpretation of the policy transmission in our model: as
we will argue later on, the low sensitivity of wages, coupled with the low steady
state costs of posting vacancies11, explains why hiring subsidies are particularly
effective in generating a high increase in firms’ vacancy posting. The large increase
in vacancy posting, coupled with the minor increase in wages, produces an increase
in both, labor and consumption demand, hence large fiscal multipliers. Finally,
under the benchmark calibration we find that the elasticity of the unemployment
rate to government expenditure shocks is 0.1912, while the elasticity with respect to
the hiring subsidy is -0.01. The latter elasticity captures the positive effect of the
hiring subsidy on labor demand.
Before computing the fiscal multipliers, it is instructive to verify that our
model is broadly in line with the main stylized facts characterizing the labor mar-
ket. To obtain the main business cycle statistics reported in Table 3, the model is
subject to AR(1) productivity, preference, government spending and home produc-
tion technology shocks with the following parametrization: sz = 0:0071, rz = 0:9,
11Notice that both facts are consistent with empirical evidence. See Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008).
12A fact consistent with evidence in Bruckner and Pappa (2010)...
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sY = 0:025, rY = 0:9, sg = 0:008, rg = 0:9, s¡ = 0:0125, r¡ = 0:9. We also as-
sume a positive correlation between TFP and home production technology shocks
of 0.3571. Calibration for the rest of the parameters is set at the benchmark values.
We also assume the presence of real wage rigidity13: an extensive literature has
indeed advocated such an assumption as particularly important in matching some
labor market stylized facts14, with particular reference to the Beveridge curve.15 In
the computation of the fiscal multipliers we consider both cases, with and without
wage rigidity, in order to asses the role of this assumption for the impact of fiscal
policy.
Table 3: Model Business Cycle Statistics
sy se=sy su=sy sv=sy sw sp Corr(u;v) Corr(n;y) Corr(u;y)
1.35 0.51 7.25 9.18 0.17 0.63 -0.34 0.12 -0.71
The model generates a volatility of employment (relative to that of output)
of 0.51 and a volatility of unemployment rate16 (relative to that of output) of 7.25:
both values are compatible with data for the U.S. The model also correctly gen-
erates a low volatility of wages and inflation, and a high volatility of vacancies.
Finally, the model reproduces the negative correlation between unemployment and
vacancies i.e., the Beveridge curve, the procyclicality of participation and the coun-
tercyclicality of unemployment.
Sensitivity parameters. As outlined earlier, and extensively explained later
in sections 3.1 and 3.2, the transmission mechanism underlying the different ef-
fectiveness of government spending versus hiring subsidy shocks, hinges on the
reaction of wages, marginal costs (hence inflation) and private consumption. For
this reason, and in order to asses robustness of our results, we also perform sensi-
tivity checks with respect to the parameters directly affecting the above-mentioned
transmission mechanism. In particular, we consider alternative parametrizations for
the workers bargaining power, which affects the response of wages to policy shocks,
the Frisch elasticity, which affects the response of both wages and participation to
policy shocks, the price and wage rigidity parameters, which affect the response of
inflation to marginal costs, and the parameters in the Taylor rule, which affect the
13Wages are set according to the partial adjustment equation wt = gwt 1+(1  g)wt , where wt
is described by the baseline wage equation (20) and the degree of real wage rigidity g , is calibrated
to 0.9.
14Notice that in our model the empirical business cycle statistics would be replicated also in
absence of wage rigidity and under a high parametrization for the replacement rate.
15See Shimer (2005), Krause and Lubik (2007) and Kuester (2010).
16Notice that we report second moments for the unemployment rate, defined as ut=nt .
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response of the policy rate to changes in inflation (therefore determining the crowd-
ing out or crowding in of consumption). At last, sensitivity is performed also with
respect to the persistence of the fiscal shock.
3 Fiscal multipliers
For each fiscal intervention we compute multipliers both in terms of employment,
and in terms of aggregate demand. We follow Uhlig (2010) in computing dynamic
multipliers:
NPVmultipliert;t+ j =
å ji=1b
i 1(xt+i  xt+i 1)
å ji=1b i 1(costt+i  costt+i 1)
(28)
where xt = et for the employment multiplier, while xt = yt for the demand multi-
plier. When considering a traditional demand stimulus, the cost associated to the
fiscal shock is given by costt = gt ; while when considering an increase in the hiring
subsidy the cost is given by costt = tkt k v.17 This is the expression used to compute
the multipliers reported in Figure 1 and Figure 3. Short-run multipliers as reported
in Table 4 and Table 5 are given by NPVmultiplier0;1 with the system being in its
steady state at time 0 and the fiscal shock being realized at time 1. The long-run
multiplier is simply NPVmultipliert;t+ j for j! ¥.18
3.1 Demand stimulus
We start by considering a temporary one percent increase in government spending
which is either financed by lump sum taxes or by distortionary labor taxes. This pol-
icy scenario allows to compare the results of our model with those in the literature,
which indeed focuses on this type of stimulus.
Figure 1 shows the aggregate demand and employment dynamic multipliers
for the baseline calibration. Furthermore, Table 4 and Table 5 report the size of the
aggregate demand and employment multipliers for the benchmark calibration (first
line in both tables). When the expansion in government expenditure is financed with
lump sum taxation, multipliers are always positive but quite small (between 0.2 and
17With this formulation we compute the cost of a change in the subsidy keeping the number of
vacancies constant at their steady state level. In equilibrium, vacancies will change reacting to the
higher subsidy. Thus, an alternative formulation for the cost could have been costt = tkt kvt . Multi-
pliers computed using this different definition are quantitatively very similar to the ones reported in
Table 4 and Table 5.
18Long-run multipliers as reported in Table 4 and Table 5 are computed by setting j = 1000.
0.3).
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Figure 1: Fiscal multipliers for a one percent temporary increase in government
spending
When a certain fraction is financed with distortionary taxation (f = 0:275),
they become smaller in the short run, turn negative after a few quarters and remain
negative in the long run. This is consistent with results found using New Keynesian
models, in which wasteful government expenditure, by producing crowding out in
private consumption, delivers small fiscal multipliers. Yuan and Li (2000) show
within an RBC model that the presence of matching frictions dampens the size of
the multipliers, the reason being that the private consumption crowding out also
reduces vacancy posting incentives. Monacelli, Perotti, and Trigari (2010) using
a New Keynesian model with matching frictions, also find small multipliers in re-
sponse to aggregate demand stimuli, even under endogenous job destruction and in
presence of physical capital. The negative long-run multipliers under distortionary
taxation are consistent with the findings in Uhlig (2010).
Relatively to the literature, our model contains a further dimension, the en-
dogenous participation margin. Figure 2, which shows the impulse response func-
tions to government spending for a number of selected variables under both lump
sum and distortionary taxation, helps to gain intuition regarding the additional
effects present in our model. As in all abovementioned models, the increase in
15
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to a one percent temporary increase in government
spending
ernment spending has a crowding out effect on private consumption. The increase
in government spending increases, on impact, labor demand and wages. The con-
sequent increase in marginal costs and inflation induces the monetary authority to
gov
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raise the nominal interest rate. The ensuing rise in the real interest rate decreases
firm’s incentives to post vacancies. In our model the initial increase in aggregate
demand produces an increase in participation, which in turn increases the incen-
tives toward vacancy posting, as it is now easier to fill a vacancy. Overall, vacancy
posting increases (even though only in the short run) and so does employment, rel-
atively to a model in which participation is kept constant. However, the increase in
vacancy posting is not enough to compensate the rise in participation, hence unem-
ployment increases as well. Under distortionary taxation the tax wedge rises, thus
dampening the beneficial effects and lowering the multipliers.
Tables 4 and 5 also report a number of sensitivity checks for both short and
long-run multipliers under both financing schemes. The robustness checks have
been conducted by selecting the parameters that govern the dynamic of wages, in-
flation and the interest rate: indeed, as explained before those are the main macro
variables involved in the transmission of the policy shock. The main highlights re-
late to the effects of changes in the bargaining power and in the elasticity of labor
supply. Changes in the bargaining affect the size of the surpluses accruing to firms
and workers in the steady state. Under low bargaining power19, firms’ steady state
share of surplus is low, while workers’ steady state share of surplus is high. In this
case wages increase by less in response to an increase in government spending, as
they are large to start with, hence the increase in the marginal cost, inflation and
interest rate are lower. The crowding out in private consumption is smaller and
multipliers are larger. The tables show that long-run multipliers (both employment
and demand) are indeed higher the higher the bargaining power.20 Next, we exam-
ine the effects of different values for the Frisch elasticity,   1n . Other things being
equal, increases in the job finding rate move participation up, the more so the higher
is the sensitivity in the adjustment of the participation margin (high elasticity of la-
bor supply). Furthermore, the more elastic is the labor supply, the less wages rise
if aggregate demand picks up, so the less inflation and the real rate rise. It follows
that under high values for the Frisch elasticity, multipliers are larger.
We then compare fiscal multipliers for different degrees of price and real
wage rigidity. We set the cost of adjusting prices y so as to generate a slope of the
log-linear Phillips curve consistent with an average price duration of two quarters
(calvo = 0:5), four quarters (calvo = 0:75), and twenty months (calvo = 0:85).
19This is the parametrization that Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) consider relevant for matching
the unemployment volatilities.
20For demand multipliers this is true also in the short run, while employment multipliers become
smaller as we increase the bargaining power. The short run reaction of the employment multipliers
is entirely driven by the short run movements in participation. Indeed, the higher the workers’
bargaining power the more congestioned is the market and the smaller is the increase in participation.
Thus, the smaller is the increase in employment on impact.
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Table 4: Employment Multipliers
Lump sum Distortionary
Short run Long run Short run Long run
Demand stimulus
Baseline model 0.2515 0.2381 0.1481 -0.0489
Bargaining power
V = 0:7 0.2292 0.2384 0.1344 -0.0454
V = 0:4 0.2756 0.2378 0.1633 -0.0520
V = 0:3 0.3313 0.2374 0.1991 -0.0569
Frisch elasticity
 1=n = 0:5 0.4916 0.4284 0.2951 -0.0015
 1=n = 0:1 0.1409 0.1411 0.0734 -0.0746
Price rigidity
calvo= 0:85 0.4733 0.3546 0.3003 0.1507
calvo= 0:75 0.3170 0.2670 0.1710 -0.0074
calvo= 0:5 0.1902 0.2143 0.1227 -0.0766
Real wage rigidity (g = 0:9) 0.3241 0.2317 0.1804 -0.0456
Persistence of stimulus
rg = 0:975 0.2256 0.2144 0.1133 -0.0581
rg = 0:5 0.5626 0.5298 0.5496 0.2948
Taylor rule
fp = 3 0.1995 0.2142 0.1253 -0.0820
fy = 0:5 0.2408 0.2232 0.1212 -0.0538
fr = 0:8 0.5171 0.2590 0.4580 -0.0032
Increase in hiring subsidies
Baseline model 2.3905 2.2690 2.6220 2.5033
Bargaining power
V = 0:7 4.4649 4.6518 4.8900 5.3767
V = 0:4 1.9348 1.6759 2.1285 1.7841
V = 0:3 1.7416 1.2563 1.9334 1.2702
Frisch elasticity
 1=n = 0:5 2.4775 2.1576 2.7942 2.5049
 1=n = 0:1 2.3037 2.3196 2.4918 2.4973
Price rigidity
calvo= 0:85 2.4466 1.8515 2.4694 1.8755
calvo= 0:75 2.5783 2.1867 2.7750 2.3678
calvo= 0:5 2.0463 2.3000 2.2406 2.5619
Real wage rigidity (g = 0:9) 3.0700 2.2107 3.2297 2.4174
Persistence of stimulus
rtk = 0:975 2.1661 2.0547 2.3734 2.2185
rtk = 0:5 2.8630 2.7227 2.9553 2.9739
Taylor rule
fp = 3 2.1708 2.3219 2.4024 2.5971
fy = 0:5 2.3270 2.1603 2.4773 2.3179
fr = 0:8 1.8288 2.1832 1.8829 2.3687
Short and long-run multipliers are larger with higher price and real wage rigidity,
both under lump sum taxation and under distortionary taxation. The degree of price
stickiness governs the slope of the Phillips curve: the more prices are sticky, the
less inflation reacts, so the smaller is the increase in the real interest rate and the
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Table 5: Aggregate Demand Multipliers
Lump sum Distortionary
Short run Long run Short run Long run
Demand stimulus
Baseline model 0.1764 0.2298 0.1128 -0.0268
Bargaining power
V = 0:7 0.1988 0.2342 0.1204 -0.0366
V = 0:4 0.1528 0.2264 0.1037 -0.0181
V = 0:3 0.1007 0.2213 0.0810 -0.0037
Frisch elasticity
 1=n = 0:5 0.3582 0.4180 0.2269 0.0210
 1=n = 0:1 0.0945 0.1341 0.0560 -0.0527
Price rigidity
calvo= 0:85 0.3082 0.3289 0.2013 0.1439
calvo= 0:75 0.2152 0.2543 0.1256 0.0084
calvo= 0:5 0.1402 0.2097 0.0979 -0.0502
Real wage rigidity (g = 0:9) 0.2111 0.2249 0.1287 -0.0240
Persistence of stimulus
rg = 0:975 0.1628 0.2102 0.0923 -0.0333
rg = 0:5 0.3562 0.4759 0.3535 0.2679
Taylor rule
fp = 3 0.1467 0.2099 0.0997 -0.0546
fy = 0:5 0.1715 0.2176 0.0963 -0.0313
fr = 0:8 0.3350 0.2479 0.3015 0.0137
Increase in hiring subsidies
Baseline model 1.2536 1.7516 1.4054 1.9610
Bargaining power
V = 0:7 3.4874 4.1594 3.8468 4.8497
V = 0:4 0.6280 1.1361 0.7252 1.2279
V = 0:3 0.0531 0.6794 0.1036 0.6908
Frisch elasticity
 1=n = 0:5 1.3478 1.6454 1.5679 1.9659
 1=n = 0:1 1.1728 1.7994 1.2880 1.9531
Price rigidity
calvo= 0:85 1.2818 1.3855 1.3030 1.4073
calvo= 0:75 1.3679 1.6791 1.4990 1.8411
calvo= 0:5 1.0424 1.7795 1.1687 2.0134
Real wage rigidity (g = 0:9) 1.5702 1.7055 1.6716 1.8904
Persistence of stimulus
rtk = 0:975 1.1158 1.5668 1.2519 1.7131
rtk = 0:5 1.5373 2.1362 1.6003 2.3616
Taylor rule
fp = 3 1.1186 1.7988 1.2692 2.0448
fy = 0:5 1.2114 1.6535 1.3105 1.7939
fr = 0:8 0.9064 1.6778 0.9423 1.8434
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crowding out of private consumption.21 The same is true with a higher degree of
real wage rigidity: the upward pressure on wages and the downward pressure on
labor demand are dampened, giving rise to larger multipliers.22
Next, we investigate how the response of monetary policy affects govern-
ment spending multipliers. We analyze a more aggressive reaction to inflation by
setting the Taylor rule coefficient fp to 3 and a stronger reaction to output fluctu-
ations by setting the Taylor coefficient fy to 0.5. Finally, we consider interest rate
smoothing by setting fr = 0:8. As explained above, an increase in government con-
sumption brings about a rise in inflation and an increase in aggregate demand. The
monetary authority raises the interest rate, the more so the higher fp or fy and the
smaller the degree of interest rate smoothing. A high degree of interest rate smooth-
ing, by lowering the rise in the interest rate, mitigates the crowding out of private
consumption thus increasing fiscal multipliers.
At last, we re-compute the fiscal multipliers for different degrees of the per-
sistence of the stimulus package. We set the persistence of the government spending
process rg, to 0.975 and 0.5. The higher the persistence of government expenditure
shocks, the stronger is the negative wealth effect implied by increased taxation. For
this reason, multipliers depend negatively on the degree of persistence.
3.2 Hiring Subsidies
In practice, fiscal stimuli have taken various forms, which go beyond the mere in-
crease of aggregate demand. This was particularly true in the aftermath of the
2007-2008 crisis: the expansionary fiscal packages approved in various countries
were largely devoted to support job creation in the labor market. The Hiring In-
centives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act, in the U.S., is an example of this.
Matching models allow us to analyze policies targeted particularly at the labor mar-
ket. One of such policies we focus on, is the introduction of subsidies to the cost of
posting vacancies. The most immediate effect of such policy, is that of increasing
hiring and job creation.
We thus consider a temporary one percentage point increase in the subsidy
to the cost of posting a vacancy. Figure 3 presents the employment and demand
dynamic multipliers under both lump sum and distortionary taxation. Furthermore,
Tables 4 and 5 report the size of the aggregate demand and employment multipliers.
A simple comparison between Figure 3 and Figure 1 makes it evident the higher
effectiveness of this policy, particularly if the fiscal authority is concerned about
employment. Now both multipliers are well above 1, both in the short run and
21Notice that multipliers remain below 0.5 even with an average price duration of 20 months.
22This extension is relevant as this is one of the assumptions used to solve the Shimer puzzle.
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Figure 3: Fiscal multipliers for a one percentage point temporary increase in the
subsidy to the cost of posting vacancies
in the long run. This is so independently of the financing strategy adopted, lump
sum versus distortionary labor tax. Hiring subsidies have a twofold effect. First,
they increase the incentive to post vacancies, hence labor demand. Second, as they
reduce firms’ marginal costs, they also reduce inflation. The monetary authority
reacts to the fall in inflation by reducing the nominal interest rate. The ensuing fall
in the real interest rate pushes private consumption upward. Hence, a hiring subsidy
policy is characterized by a crowding in of private consumption. The result is an
overall increase in aggregate demand, output and employment.
Figure 3 also shows that, contrary to the demand stimulus, multipliers are
higher if distortionary taxation is in place. The reason for this result is that such a
policy might actually become self-financing. Figure 4 shows the rationale for this
result. Under an increase in hiring subsidy both private consumption and vacancy
posting increase. At the same time participation declines: since market consump-
tion is higher, households decide to increase home production. The combined effect
of a fall in participation and of an increase in vacancy posting produces an increase
in employment and a fall in unemployment. From the point of view of the fiscal au-
thority, the direct consequence of such combined movements is higher tax revenues.
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to a one percentage point temporary increase in the
subsidy to the cost of posting vacancies
Such an increase is large enough to allow the fiscal authority to run a temporary mi-
nor decrease in the labor tax: this explains the higher multipliers relatively to the
case with lump sum taxation.
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Tables 4 and 5 report again a number of sensitivity checks for both short
and long-run multipliers under both financing schemes. The robustness checks
have been conducted considering the same parameters analyzed for the government
spending shock.
First, we analyze the effect of changes in the bargaining power. Under high
values of bargaining power, the surplus accruing to the firm, as well as the hiring
costs, in the steady state are smaller. The size of the hiring costs in the steady state is
relevant in judging the effects of the hiring policies, as the outlays of the government
used to compute the multipliers refer to the level of the hiring costs. If hiring costs
tend to be small to start with, vacancy multipliers are larger than if hiring costs are
large. As expected indeed employment and aggregate demand multipliers are larger
under higher values of the bargaining power. Also, recall that under high bargaining
power, the increase in wages in response to an increase in labor demand is smaller,
as wages are higher to start with. This results in larger decreases of the marginal
costs, inflation and the real interest rate. The overall effect is also an amplification
of the crowding in of private consumption.
Secondly, we consider the effect of changes in the Frisch elasticity. A high
labor supply elasticity dampens the increase in wages, following the increase in
labor demand. Under high Frisch elasticity, hiring subsidies produce larger falls in
marginal costs, inflation and real interest rates and a larger crowding in of private
consumption.
Thirdly, we investigate the effect of changing the Taylor rule coefficients.
Under a strong reaction to inflation, hiring subsidies lead to a larger interest rate
fall that increases the long-run fiscal multipliers. Everything else equal, a stronger
reaction of the interest rate to output dampens fiscal multipliers through a drop in
private consumption. Interest rate smoothing, by mitigating the monetary policy
accommodation, dampens fiscal multipliers compared to our baseline scenario.
Finally, and similarly to what observed for the aggregate demand stimulus,
decreasing the persistence of the fiscal stimulus has positive effects on the size of
the multipliers.
4 Conclusions
A large literature has found that government spending multipliers tend to be smaller
than unity except for special, but possibly unrealistic, circumstances.23 The ques-
tion therefore arises whether a government which aims at stimulating economic
activity and employment, might find other, more effective, means of providing such
23One of such circumstances is the case of rule of thumb consumers, namely the assumption that
a certain fraction of consumers is prohibited from saving.
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a stimulus. The results in this paper suggest that well targeted labor market poli-
cies, in the form for instance of hiring subsidies, can be such instruments. Actual
labor market stimulus policies, such as the HIRE Act, show that our results are in-
deed also in the radar of the policy perception. While our results are robust to a
number of parameters and policy settings, in this paper we neglect the role of an
endogenous firing margin: an increase in employment, achieved through the imple-
mentation of hiring subsidies, might indeed bring about also an increase, ex post, in
the firing rate. The latter might partly reduce the beneficial effect of hiring subsidies
on output. All this is left for future research.
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